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The Securitization of Longevity Risk and its Implications for Retirement Security 
Abstract 
The economic significance of longevity risk for governments, corporations, and individuals has begun to 
be recognized and quantified. The traditional insurance route for managing this risk has serious 
limitations due to capacity constraints that are becoming more and more binding. If the 2010 U.S. 
population lived three years longer than expected then the government would have to set aside 50% of the 
U.S. 2010 GDP or approximately $7.37 trillion to fully fund that increased social security liability. This is 
just one way of gauging the size of the risk. Due to the much larger capacity of capital markets more 
attention is being devoted to transforming longevity risk from its pure risk form to a speculative risk form 
so that it can be traded in the capital markets. This transformation has implications for governments, 
corporations and individuals that will be explored here. The analysis will view the management of 
longevity risk by considering how defined contribution plans can be managed to increase the sustainable 
length of retirement and by considering how defined benefit plans can be managed to reduce pension risk 
using longevity risk hedging schemes. 
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The Securitization of Longevity Risk and Its 
Implications for Retirement Security
Richard MacMinn, Patrick Brockett, Jennifer Wang, Yijia Lin, and  
Ruilin Tian
The simplest notion of  individual longevity risk is that it is the possibility that one will 
outlive one’s accumulated wealth. The risk of  outliving one’s accumulated wealth 
has many unpleasant consequences for individuals and societies, and because the 
risk is increasing it must be addressed. If  an individual is covered by a defined con-
tribution (DC) plan, the employee contributes to the plan until retirement. The 
employer may or may not match the employee’s contribution. Accumulated wealth 
generated during the individual’s working life yields the wealth that the individual 
will use to generate a retirement income stream. If  the individual is covered by 
a defined benefit (DB) plan, the employer guarantees to provide the employee a 
designated amount of  money upon retirement up until the employee’s death. The 
employee may or may not contribute to the plan. The designated amount is based 
on the employee’s earnings, length of  employment, and age. With a DC plan, the 
employee is responsible for ensuring that enough money has been contributed to 
the account to avoid longevity risk. With a DB plan, the employer is liable for ensur-
ing that the plan does not run out of  money before the employee dies. In the first 
case the individual faces the longevity risk, while in the second case the pension 
provider faces the longevity risk.
Both plans have distinctive risks and in this chapter we examine the risks from the 
perspective of  the individual and the institution. Longevity risk is important in part 
because of  its size; international pension liabilities have been estimated at approxi-
mately $21 trillion. Longevity risk is also important because as life expectancy 
increases, individuals must increase contributions to their DC plans to mitigate lon-
gevity risk and the size of  the necessary additional contribution is uncertain, as it 
depends in part on how life expectancies change over time. Hence the questions of  
interest here include: What happens to the financial well-being of  a retired cohort 
in the event of  an unexpected change in life expectancy or financial stability? What 
happens if  it does not manage these risks? What happens if  it does manage these 
risks using currently available instruments? How might it manage the longevity risk 
with longevity instruments?
In what follows, we first explore the meaning of  longevity risk and consider 
its magnitude. Next we consider how mortality and longevity risks have been 
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transformed from pure risks to speculative risks. Subsequently we examine longev-
ity risk and financial market risks from the perspective of  those who bear them; we 
show a need for more longevity instruments in the retail market and some of  the 
benefits of  the existing longevity instruments in the wholesale market for longevity 
risk. A final section concludes.
Longevity Risk
Risk can be defined as the negative consequences of  uncertainty. Both uncertainty 
(multiple possible outcomes) and negative consequences are necessary prerequi-
sites for risk to exist (Baranoff et al. 2009). Since most people find longer life desir-
able, the term ‘longevity risk’ needs further explication to provide the context in 
which longevity presents a ‘risk’ rather than a ‘benefit’ to individuals and/or insti-
tutions. Longevity risk is the risk that an individual life span or the average popula-
tion life span will exceed expectations. The negative consequences of  an extended 
life span can include outliving one’s friends, diminished mobility and cognitive 
flexibility/focus, and outliving one’s financial resources after retirement without 
the remedial possibility of  rejoining the workforce to produce necessary income 
at the later date wherein the probability (or the eventuality) that financial assets 
will soon be depleted becomes recognized. Longevity risk has an unsystematic or 
idiosyncratic component, as well as a systematic component. The idiosyncratic 
component is sometimes described as the risk of  an individual outliving one’s accu-
mulated wealth; Milevsky (2006) describes this as ‘retirement ruin.’ The systematic 
component corresponds to the more general hazard that people in the aggregate 
will live longer than expected (Oppers et al. 2012), thus causing strain on pensions, 
employers, and society in general. The systematic component is often referred to as 
aggregate longevity risk in the literature (MacMinn et al. 2006; Blake et al. 2013). 
The aggregate longevity risk discussed here is the risk of  living longer than one 
expects; it is also a systematic risk because life expectations are themselves random 
variables.
From a financial perspective, the unsystematic component of  longevity risk 
may be handled by holding a sufficiently diversified and adequately funded asset 
portfolio to decumulate during retirement. If  life expectancy were certain, the 
individual could purchase an annuity certain designed to provide the desired 
cash flow for the certain life expectancy. Alternatively, the individual could pur-
chase a bond with the desired flow of  coupon payments and leave the principal 
repayment as a bequest to beneficiaries but because life expectancy is uncertain, 
the individual must design a portfolio of  assets to provide a desired cash flow for 
an undetermined period of  time. This portfolio may consist of  equity, bonds, 
and possibly a life annuity. The life annuity is an asset that provides a specified 
cash flow for the remaining years of  an individual’s life. If  the unsystematic 
component of  life expectancy were the only risk faced by an individual then 
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a life annuity may be shown to dominate other assets (Yaari 1965). However, 
the risk of  outliving one’s accumulated wealth is not the only unsystematic risk. 
Increased life expectancy includes morbidity (and other) risks as well, implying 
that just a life annuity would not cover a long-term illness, dementia, etc., and 
therefore a diversified asset portfolio is still needed (Sinclair and Smetters 2004; 
Horneff et al. 2009; MacMinn and Weber 2010; Chai et al. 2011).
From a financial perspective, at the firm or society level, aggregate longevity risk 
(the systematic component) must be managed. The management choices include 
bearing the risk or transferring or trading the risk to some other entity willing to 
bear it. In deciding among these alternatives, a determination must be made on 
how to price this risk transfer appropriately. This aspect of  longevity risk might be 
thought of  as a trend risk or the risk of  underestimating life expectancy (Blake et al. 
2013). Alternatively, as noted, we may think of  life expectancy itself  as a random 
variable. Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) show the record life expectancy for females 
as projected by a number of  authors and organizations and report the rather sur-
prising result that the record female life expectancy has increased by three months 
per year for more than 150 years. Hence, Oeppen and Vaupel also show that each 
historical life expectancy prediction has been wrong. With reference to 2005 mor-
tality rates, they note that U.K. mortality rates had declined over the previous 
10–15 years by over 2 percent per annum for the age groups over 60. Referring to 
the 2 percent decline and using government actuarial department (GAD) figures, 
Turner made the following comment about mortality rates (2006: 562):
If  they continue at that rate, male life expectancy at sixty-five, currently esti-
mated at nineteen, will reach about thirty by 2050. If  the rate accelerates to 
3 percent, life expectancy would soar to 37 years. Only if  it decelerates to 
1 percent would the GAD’s 2002-based principal projection of  22 years in 
2050 be correct. So the GAD 2002 projection—a major increase from previ-
ous projections—nevertheless still assumed a major deceleration of  mortality 
rate improvement.
The errors in life expectancy estimates noted here highlight the systematic risk of  
longevity risk and the magnitude of  the risk.
It is important to understand the vast financial size of  the longevity risk problem. 
Turner (2006) estimated £2.5 ($4.3) trillion in liabilities subject to longevity risk in 
the U.K. Swiss Re has since estimated $20.7 trillion in pension liabilities subject 
to longevity risk internationally (Burne 2011). Oppers et al. (2012: 8) provide a 
different perspective by calculating the cost of  maintaining the retirement living 
standard due to aging and longevity shocks as a percentage of  gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) for advanced and emerging countries. Using the demographic trends 
predicted by the United Nations, they note:
In the baseline population forecast and with a 60 percent replacement rate, 
the annual cost rises from 5.3 percent to 11.1 percent of  GDP in advanced 
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economies and from 2.3 percent to 5.9 percent of  GDP in emerging econo-
mies . . . Taken over the full period, the cumulative cost of  this increase because 
of  aging in this scenario is about 100 percent of  2010 GDP for the advanced 
economies and about half  that amount in emerging economies.
The authors also observe that a longevity shock of  three years would add almost 
an additional 50 percent to these cumulative costs of  aging by 2050. There is 
uncertainty surrounding all of  these predictions, but the magnitudes are hard 
to ignore.
Ignoring longevity risk is indeed a significant problem. Oppers et al. (2012) use 
data from the U.S. Department of  Labor (DOL) to estimate the longevity risk faced 
by DB plans. They report many plans used outdated mortality tables; the majority 
of  the plans used the 1983 Group Annuity Mortality (GAM) until recently. Using 
out-of-date mortality tables exposes pension plans to longevity risk and risk of  ruin. 
Dushi et al. (2010) compare pension liability values based on the plans’ longevity 
assumptions versus the pension liability values forecast by the Lee–Carter mortal-
ity model and find that the outdated mortality tables could understate the pension 
liability for a typical male participant by approximately 12 percent.
Longevity risk can be borne or transferred, in whole or in part. The retail market 
for longevity risk allows consumers to transfer all or part of  the risk with life annui-
ties. In the U.K., this market amounts to £135 billion, but this is because consumers 
are required by law to at least annuitize before they turn 75 (Loeys et al. 2007).1 The 
retail or life annuity market remains very small in the U.S. since there is no similar 
requirement that individuals annuitize when they retire. In fact, this general lack of  
a sizable life annuity market has been described as the annuity puzzle, since Yaari 
(1965) and Davidoff et al. (2005), among others, have shown that in the absence 
of  a bequest motive, the life annuity instrument for retirement funding dominates 
other asset choices.
A wholesale market for longevity risk would allow pension funds and insurers the 
ability to transfer some of  the longevity risk rather than bearing it. The U.K. whole-
sale market has been active and many of  the transactions take the form of  buyouts 
and buy-ins.2 In a buyout, there is a transfer of  pension assets and liabilities for a 
particular cohort; the cost of  the buyout is the difference between the values of  the 
assets and the liabilities transferred. The difference between the asset and liability 
values may be covered by a loan with a known cash flow that is well understood 
by investors. In the buy-in, there is a bulk purchase of  annuities from an insurer to 
hedge the risk of  the liabilities associated with one or more cohorts. This immu-
nizes the pension fund from the liability risk for the cohorts covered.
The retail and wholesale markets noted here do provide a transfer mechanism 
for the market participants but the mechanisms are crude instruments. More than 
one risk is transferred and the risks are aggregated rather than disaggregated; this 
generates more concentration of  risk and hence amplifies the eventual probability 
of  insolvency for those concentrations. Given the size of  the longevity risks, this 
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becomes a new problem that is inconsistent with the history of  financial markets. 
‘Indeed, the history of  the development of  risk instruments is a tale of  the progres-
sive separation of  risks, enabling each to be borne in the least expensive way’ (Kohn 
1999: 2).
Securitization
Longevity risk has put corporations, governments, and individuals under a sig-
nificant financial burden. One common way to manage this risk is securitization 
(i.e. isolating the cash flows that are linked to longevity risk and repackaging them 
into cash flows that are traded in capital markets). The earliest securitizations were 
‘block of  business’ securitizations used to capitalize expected future profits from a 
block of  life business, such as to recover embedded values3 or to exit from a geo-
graphical line of  business. Cowley and Cummins (2005) introduced the early devel-
opment of  the securitization in life insurance. More recently, Blake et al. (2013) 
provided a more comprehensive and global overview of  the emergence of  the mar-
ket in traded assets and liabilities linked to longevity and mortality and referred to 
this market as the New Life Market. They noted that the New Life Market would 
act as a catalyst to help facilitate the development of  annuity markets both in the 
developed and the developing world and protect the long-term global viability of  
retirement income provision.
The idea of  mortality securitization was initially proposed by Cox et al. (2000). 
The first mortality bond, known as Vita I, was issued by Swiss Re in 2003; it was 
designed to hedge mortality risk rather than to hedge longevity risk. Nevertheless, 
it provides an important successful example of  a Life Market instrument. Vita 
I  was a success, and led to additional bonds being issued to investors on less 
favorable terms.4 Blake and Burrows (2001) were the first to advocate the use of  
mortality-linked securities to transfer longevity risk to capital markets. They sug-
gested that the governments should help pension funds and insurance compa-
nies hedge their mortality risks by issuing survivor bonds. In 2004, the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and BNP Paribas launched a longevity bond that was the 
first securitization instrument designed to transfer longevity risk; ultimately it was 
not issued due to insufficient demand. Design issues, such as the introduction of  
basis risk, pricing issues, institutional issues, and educational issues, were among 
the reasons why the EIB/BNP bond did not launch (Lin and Cox 2008).
The lack of  success in issuing long-dated longevity bonds has led to a derivatives 
design effort. Various new securitization instruments and derivatives for longev-
ity risk, such as mortality forwards, survivor swaps, survivor futures, and survivor 
options have received attention among academics and practitioners.5 In 2007, J.P. 
Morgan introduced the first capital market derivative for a longevity hedge; it has 
become known as a ‘q-forward.’ A q-forward can be used to hedge the value of  the 
pension liability or the associated cash flows. More complex, life-related derivatives 
can be constructed by using the q-forward as a basic building block. A portfolio 
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of  q-forwards can be used to replicate and to hedge the longevity exposure of  an 
annuity or a pension liability or to hedge the mortality exposure for a book of  life 
business. Following the introduction of  a q-forward transaction, a longevity swap 
was used to exchange actual pension payments for a series of  pre-agreed fixed 
payments. This particular swap was legally constituted as an insurance contract 
and was not a capital market instrument. There have been 16 publicly announced 
transactions of  longevity swaps executed between 2007 and 2012 in the U.K. 
(Blake et al. 2013).
A Financial Market Model
Suppose the financial market consists of  the S&P 500 index, the Merrill Lynch 
corporate bond index, and a three-month T-bill. Following Cox et al. (2013), we 
describe the return dynamics of  the S&P 500 index as A1,t and the Merrill Lynch 
corporate bond index as A2,t at time t as a combination of  Brownian motion and 
a compound Poisson process. The stochastic process of  the three-month T-bill 
return A3,t is simply described as Brownian motion. The three returns are as follows:
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where the constants α α α1 2 3, ,  and σ σ σ1 2 3, ,  are the drift and volatility meas-
ures of  the S&P 500 return, the Merrill Lynch corporate bond return, and the 
three-month T-bill rate given no jumps. The parameter k E Y1 1 1≡ −( ) is the 
expected percentage change in the S&P 500 return and k2 is similarly defined for 
the Merrill Lynch corporate bond return if  a Poisson event occurs. The parameters 
λ1  and λ2  are the mean numbers of  arrivals per unit time of  the Poisson processes 
Nt
1  and Nt
2  respectively. The jump size Y j1  or Y j2  is independent and identically 
distributed as a lognormal random variable with the size parameter m1 and the 
volatility parameter S1 or m2 and S2. Y j1  andY j2  are independent for all i and j. The 
correlation between the standard Brownian motions of  the S&P 500 index and the 
Merrill Lynch corporate bond index, W1t and W2t, is captured by the correlation 
coefficient ρ12  (i.e.CovW W tt t( , )1 2 12 1 2= ρ σ σ ).
We further assume the three-month T-bill is uncorrelated with either the S&P 
500 index or the Merrill Lynch corporate bond index. Based on the annual data of  
the S&P 500 and the Merrill Lynch corporate bond provided by the DataStream 
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and the three-month T-bill rates from FRED at Federal Reserve Bank of  St. Louis 
from 1989 to 2010, we estimate models (8-1), (8-2), and (8-3) to obtain the model 
parameters. The estimated parameters are based on annual data and are reported 
in Table 8.1.
In what follows we will use these estimates to forecast returns for investor portfo-
lios and for DB plans.
DC Plans
Given the financial market model developed in the previous section, suppose the 
individual investor or, equivalently, the retiree selects a portfolio ( , , )ω ω ω1 2 3  in the 
S&P 500 index, the Merrill Lynch corporate bond index, and the three-month 
T-bill, respectively. Given our interest in longevity risk we investigate the length of  
a sustainable retirement period under the following two assumptions: (1) The indi-
vidual invests in a TIAA-CREF-type lifecycle fund;6 (2) The individual invests in a 
portfolio based on his own preferences.
Assumption (1): Investment in a TIAA-CREF-type 
Lifecycle Fund
The TIAA-CREF Lifecycle Funds consist of  a series of  target retirement date 
funds in five-year increments (2010, 2015, 2020, etc.), where an investor selects 
the fund that most closely matches his or her retirement year (e.g. a Lifecycle 2040 
Table 8.1 Maximum likelihood parameter estimates of  three pension assets using annual 
data
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate
α1 0.0866 α2 0.0691 α3 0.0515
σ1 0.0864 σ2 0.0547 σ3 0.0329
λ1 0.2742 λ2 0.0505 ρ12 0.6016
m1 −0.3048 m2 −0.1468
s1 0.0000 s2 0.0000
Notes: α1 , α2 , α3  and σ1, σ2, σ3 are the drift and volatility measures of  the returns of  the S&P 
500 index, Merrill Lynch corporate bond index, and three-month T-bill. λ1  and λ2  are the mean 
numbers of  arrivals per unit time of  the Poisson processes for the returns of  the S&P 500 and Merrill 
Lynch corporate bond indices. m1 (m2 ) and s1 ( s2 ) are the size parameter and volatility parameter 
of  the lognormal jump size for the return of  S&P 500 (Merrill Lynch corporate bond) index. ρ12 is the 
correlation coefficient between the geometric Brownian motions of  the returns of  S&P 500 and Merrill 
Lynch corporate bond indices.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
 The Securitization of Longevity Risk 141
Fund is for an investor planning to retire in or around 2040). The funds are profes-
sionally managed and automatically adjust over time. For a retiree who invests in 
a TIAA-CREF-type Retirement Fund, the portfolio allocation at different ages is 
illustrated in Table 8.2.7
Assumption (2): Investment in a Self-selected Portfolio.
To consider all possible combinations ofω1 and ω2 , we note that short selling is 
not allowed. In this case the investment in equity and bond indices satisfies 
0 11 2≤ + ≤ω ω .
Investor Portfolio Analysis
We investigate the sustainable length of  a retiree’s retirement savings when the 
financial market experiences the following two scenarios:
Base Case
Suppose the financial market maintains the same trend and volatility that it has 
demonstrated over the past 20 years.8 As such, we use the parameters in Table 8.1 
calibrated with historical data to forecast the returns of  the three pension assets. 
Under the Base case, the stock market will experience about 10/(1/0.2742) = 2.74 
crashes every ten years. The crashes in the bond market take place less fre-
quently. Every ten years, an investment in corporate bonds is expected to face 10/
(1/0.505) = 0.51 crashes.9
BaseX2 Case
Suppose financial crashes happen twice as frequently as what the market experi-
enced in the past 20 years. As such, we double the parameters λ1, m1, and s1 for the 
stock index and λ2, m2, and s2 for the bond index. Under the BaseX2 case, the stock 
and bond markets will experience 5.48 and 1.01 crashes every ten years.
Table 8.2 Asset allocation at different ages (percentage)
Age 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 and older
Equity 50 49 48 47 46 45 44 43 42 41 40
Bonds 38 38 38 38 39 39 39 39 39 40 40
Risk Free 12 13 14 15 15 16 17 18 19 19 20
Note: All the numbers for equity, bonds, and risk-free assets are in percentages.
Source: TIAA-CREF (2013).
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We simulate the returns of  three pension assets from t = 0 when the individual 
retires. Based on the United States male population mortality data from 1901 to 
2007,10 we assume the maximal age he can live is 103. For each yield path, we simu-
late 58 years after t = 0. Suppose the initial retirement fund at time 0 is M0 = M and 
the retiree withdraws Wd per period starting from t = 1. The value of  the retirement 
fund Mt at time t depends on the amount invested in asset i at time t−1, Ai,t−1 and its 
return in period t and ri,t. Hence,
 
M A r tt i t
i
i t= + =−
=
∑ , ,( ), , , ,...1
1
3
1 1 2 3   
 
(8.4)
and the following equation holds for the retiree:
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The sustainable length of  the retirement fund, S , is calculated as:
 
S t N M Wt d= ∈ ≥{ }+max |  (8.6)
We run 1,000 simulations with the market parameters to generate 1,000 yield 
paths for each pension asset. For each yield path, we calculate sustainable length Si  
based on equations (8.4), (8.5), and (8.6). For the random variable S , we investi-
gate three measures (the mean, VaR1%, and CVaR1%) as shown in models (8.7), (8.8), 
and (8.9) respectively.
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where S stands for the sustainable length of  the retiree’s retirement fund, VaR S1%( )
gives the smallest sustainable period such that the probability of  observing a sus-
tainable period greater than it is 99 percent, and CVaR S1%( ) gives the expected sus-
tainable period conditional on the sustainable period being shorter than VaR S1%( ) . 
The impact of  portfolio allocation on the mean, VaR1%, and CVaR1% of  the sustain-
able length is sensitive to the initial retirement savings M and the annual withdrawal 
Wd, which can be explained following two lines of  thought that lead to opposite 
conclusions. First, due to the risk and return tradeoff, we should be able to observe 
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a negative relationship between the mean and CVaR1% (or VaR1%) because the latter 
is a measure of  risk. Second, the mean and the tail expectation of  a random vari-
able could move in the same direction, since both come from the same distribution.
Results for the TIAA-CREF-type Lifecycle Fund
Given an initial retirement fund M = $1,000,000, we assume the retiree invests in 
a TIAA-CREF-type retirement fund. That is, the portfolio allocation changes over 
time as specified in Table 8.2. The sustainable length of  the fund for the Base case 
and the BaseX2 case under different annual withdrawal strategies is illustrated in 
Table 8.3.
We further investigate how the individual’s funding status would be affected 
if  the financial market deteriorates due to more frequent crashes (BaseX2 case). 
Setting the Base case as the benchmark, the influence of  market deterioration on 
the individual retirement fund is expressed as the difference of  the sustainable 
length between the Base and BaseX2 cases. The differences in mean, VaR1%, and 
CVaR1%  are illustrated in Figure 8.1. Figure 8.1 shows that if  the financial markets 
0
5
10
15
20
25
$55,000 125,000115,000105,00095,00085,00075,00065,000
Di Mean (Base-BaseX2) Di VaR_1% (Base-BaseX2)
Di CVaR_1% (Base-BaseX2)
Figure  8.1. Comparison between Base and BaseX2 cases for an investor holding a 
TIAA-CREF-type retirement fund.
Note: The Base case assumes the financial market maintains the same trend and volatility that it has 
demonstrated throughout the past 20 years. The BaseX2 case supposes financial crashes happen twice 
as frequently as the market has experienced in the past 20 years. The vertical axis shows the sustainable 
periods in years and the horizontal axis is the annual withdrawal.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
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become more volatile, in the sense that crashes become more frequent, then the 
individual can expect to lose more than 20 periods from the sustainable retirement 
fund. Figure 8.1 and Table 8.3 also show that, under the same circumstances, a 
retiree can lose eight sustainable periods from the VaR1%  at the lowest annual with-
drawal ($55,000). Finally, the difference in CVaR represents the loss in sustainable 
periods in the tail of  the distribution sustainable periods and Figure 8.1 shows that 
for the lowest withdrawal rate the investor can expect to lose 8.1 of  the sustainable 
retirement periods; the expected tail loss eventually diminishes with the withdrawal 
rate since the number of  sustainable retirement periods also diminishes.
When both the initial fund M and annual withdrawal Wd are allowed to change, 
we demonstrate the impact of  M and Wd on the sustainable number of  periods in 
Figure 8.2. This figure shows that the BaseX2 case deteriorates from the Base case. 
As one expects, the figure shows that the sustainable number of  retirement years 
increases with M and decreases with Wd. Given M = $1,000,000 and Wd = $55,000, 
the expected number of  sustainable retirement periods is 35 in the Base case, while 
it is about 13 periods if  Wd is increased to $100,000.
If  the investor realizes returns in the tail of  the portfolio distribution, then the 
CVaR1 1%  yields 13 and 8 periods for these two withdrawal rates respectively in the 
Base case. Again given M = $1,000,000, the expected number of  sustainable retire-
ment periods is greater than the life expectancy of  a 65-year-old U.S. male (i.e. 
19.4 years) if  he withdraws no more than $75,000 per year; even here, however, a 
withdrawal rate of  $55,000 will not sustain that 65-year-old to his life expectancy. 
Since there is a 30 percent chance that the 65-year-old will live to 90, the M = 
$1,000,000 and Wd = $55,000 may be adequate unless he experiences returns in 
the tail of  the portfolio distribution; then the sustainable retirement period is clearly 
inadequate. In the event that crashes are more frequent, Table 8.3 shows that given 
M = $1,000,000 and Wd= $55,000, the expected and conditional tail-expected val-
ues for sustainable periods become 12.38 and 5.4 respectively. Hence, the expecta-
tions fall far short of  the life expectancy if  the financial market deteriorates, as in 
the BaseX2 case. One of  the additional difficulties for the investor facing financial 
risk and longevity risk is that his perceived life expectancy may fall short of  his 
actual life expectancy (i.e. the individual may get the trend wrong).
Results for Other Portfolios
Next we suppose the investor selects a portfolio for retirement based on his own 
preferences.11 Given an initial retirement asset M at t = 0 of  $1,000,000, we show 
how the sustainable periods are affected by the annual withdrawal Wd and port-
folio allocation under the Base and BaseX2 scenarios. Figures 8.3 and 8.4 show 
the mean and CVaR1% of  the sustainable lengths respectively. The three surfaces 
from top to bottom stand for sustainable periods with withdrawal rates of  $75,000, 
$100,000, and $125,000 respectively. As Figure 8.3 shows, in the Base case, the 
initial investment of  M = $1,000,000 and Wd = $75,000 allows the investor to 
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generate an expected sustainable retirement of  almost 35 periods given the portfo-
lio ( , , )ω ω ω1 2 3  = (0, 1, 0) (i.e. the investor plunges in the bond index fund). Figure 
8.3 also shows that in the BaseX2 case, the investor can generate an expected sus-
tainable retirement of  almost 24 years by investing in the portfolio ( , , )ω ω ω1 2 3 = 
(0, 0, 1) (i.e. the investor plunges in T-bills). Again in the case of  an initial invest-
ment of  M = $1,000,000 and Wd = $75,000, Figure 8.4 shows that to maximize 
the number of  sustainable retirement years in the tail measured by CVaR1%, the 
investor should invest 30 percent of  his fund in the bond index and the remaining 
70 percent in T-bills (i.e., ( , , )ω ω ω1 2 3 = (0, 0.3, 0.7)) in the Base case; this portfolio 
yields almost 18 sustainable retirement periods. Figure 8.4 also shows that in the 
BaseX2 case, the investor should choose the portfolio with 10 percent invested in 
the bond index and 90 percent invested in T-bills (i.e. ( , , )ω ω ω1 2 3 = (0, 0.1, 0.9))
12 
to maximize the number of  sustainable retirement periods in the tail; this portfo-
lio yields 11 sustainable retirement periods. In other words, to reduce tail risk, the 
investor should choose a more conservative portfolio and invest more in risk-free 
assets such as T-bills.
DB Plans
DB plans put longevity risk on the pension provider, not the individual. The DB 
provider is a trustee who should act in the interests of  the retirement cohort; we 
consider one retirement cohort. Since the DB plan is exposed to financial and lon-
gevity risks, one objective is to minimize the total unfunded liability (TUL) of  the 
plan subject to any appropriate constraints. The TUL up to the terminal age of  
the retirees is defined as the present value of  the sequence of  unfunded liabilities. 
Hence TUL is
TUL
ULt
t
t
=
+( )=
∞
∑
11 ρ
where the random variable ULt is the underfunding at time t. We suppose that T is 
the retirement date of  the cohort. Then for t ≤ T, the plan’s unfunded liability ULt 
equals
 UL PBO PA C t Tt t t= − +( ) =, , , , .    1 2 …  (8.10)
In (8.10) PBOt is the pension benefit obligation and PAt is the date t pension asset 
value. When t >T, ULt equals
 UL PBO PA B p t T Tt t t t T x T= − + ⋅ = + +− ˆ , ,,       1 2 …  (8.11)
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where B is the survival benefit and t T x Tp− ˆ ,  is the conditional expected probability 
that a plan member age x at time T survives t − T years when t > T.
Following Cox et al. (2013), who investigate capital market and longevity risks, 
we solve the following constrained minimization problem, or equivalently the pen-
sion optimization problem:
 
Minimize Var
subject to 
UL
E TUL
CVaR
t
t
t 1
0
1 +( )



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
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{ } =
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i
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i
n
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≤ ≤
=
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ω
ω
0 1
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0
1
,   = 1,2, ,n…
 
(8.12)
In (8.12), we require the expected TUL to equal zero. To control the under-
funding risk, we impose an α-level conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) constraint on 
the total unfunded liability (i.e. E(TUL|TUL ≥ VaR95%) = τ).
13 Short selling is not 
allowed for the plan, so ωi≥0.
DB Base Case
To obtain the optimal solutions for the Base case for a DB plan given the pension 
optimization problem in (8.12) with the Lee and Carter (1992) mortality model and 
the pension asset models (8.1), (8.2), and (8.3), suppose the DB plan has members 
who all join the plan at age x0 45=  (t = 0) and retire at age x = 65  (T = 20). The 
annual survival benefit payment after retirement is B = $10 million and the pension 
fund at t = 0 is $5 million. Following Cox et al. (2013), we set the pension valuation 
rate at ρ = 0 08.  and the life annuity discount rate at r = 0 05. . In addition, the 
plan will amortize the unfunded liability over m = 7  years as in Panteli (2010) and 
following Maurer et al. (2009), we set the penalty factors on the supplementary 
contributions and withdrawals at ψ1 = ψ2 = 0.2. Our objective is to find the optimal 
pension asset allocation and contribution strategies for the plan throughout the life 
of  the cohort.
We set year 2007 as our base year t = 0 and run a Monte Carlo simulation with 
1,000 iterations to generate forecasts for the three financial asset returns and pen-
sion liabilities PBOt  for t = 1 2, , .…  The downside risk parameter is set at 60 and 
given τ = 60, the optimal solution for (8.12) is shown in Table 8.4.
To achieve the lowest underfunding variance J and the target CVaR TUL95%( )  of  
60, the plan should invest 27 percent of  its funds in the S&P 500 index, 43 percent 
in the Merrill Lynch corporate bond index, and the remaining 30 percent of  its 
funds in three-month T-bills. In addition, givenE TUL( ) = 0 , the optimal annual 
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contribution is C = 3.34. The total pension cost represents the present value of  all 
normal contributions, C, supplementary contributions, SCt  and withdrawals, Wt . 
A higher TPC lowers the plan’s underfunding risk but imposes a higher cost on the 
plan sponsor. To achieve the level of  CVaR TUL95%( ) = 60, the expected total pen-
sion cost is ETPC = 36.08.
Longevity Risk Effect
To examine the adverse effect of  an unexpected mortality improvement on the 
plan, we change the value of  the Base case g in the model to other possible values; 
in the Lee–Carter model, mortality is a function of  a common risk factor and the 
risk factor is described as a random walk with drift g. This drift g may be thought of  
as the systematic risk component of  mortality. A more negative value of  g implies a 
more substantial mortality improvement. GivenCVaR TUL95 60%( ) = , the adverse 
effect of  the longevity risk is captured by the higher E(TPC), since the plan must 
adjust E(TPC) upward to reflect higher longevity risk.
Table 8.5 shows the optimization results given different assumptions on g after 
solving the optimization problem (8.12). As g decreases from the Base case −0.20 
to −0.40, E(TPC) increases notably from 36.08 to 39.06 (i.e. an 8.3 percent rise); 
this is due to the higher normal contribution C = 3.62 with g = −0.40, compared to 
C = 3.34 with g = −0.20. The increased longevity risk increases the normal contri-
bution and puts more weight in the tails of  the underfunding distribution. Hence an 
increase in longevity risk increases the variance J of  the underfunding distribution. 
That variance increases from 624.41 to 709.96 as g decreases from −0.2 to −0.4. 
In addition, as g decreases, the plan invests more in the safe asset. Equivalently, the 
plan manager must elect a higher portfolio weight for the safe asset, so as to satisfy 
his downside risk constraint (that is, the CVaR95%(TUL) = 60).
Table 8.4 Optimal solution for the Base case with  
model (5.13)
C ω1 ω2 ω3 J
3.34 0.27 0.43 0.30 624.41
Notes: C stands for the normal contribution. J is the value of  the 
objective function in Model (5-13), which measures the variance 
of  total unfunded liability. ( ω1 , ω2 , ω3 ) represents the investment 
strategy where ω1 , ω2 , and ω3 are the proportions invested in the 
S&P 500 index, Merrill Lynch corporate bond index, and 3-month 
T-bill, respectively. The Base case assumes the financial market 
maintains the same trend and volatility that it has demonstrated 
throughout the past 20 years.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
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Capital Market Risk Effects
To examine the capital market risk effect on the pension plan, we double the val-
ues of  the volatility, jump size, and jump arrival rate parameters for the S&P 500 
index and the Merrill Lynch corporate bond index in Table 8.1, simulate, and 
resolve the optimization model (8.12). The results with the doubled parameter val-
ues of  the S&P 500 index and the Merrill Lynch corporate bond index are shown 
in Table 8.6; they provide important insights for the pension plan with respect to 
possible market crashes. Given g equal to the Base case level of  −0.20 and a more 
volatile capital market, the E(TPC) increases by 16.6 percent from 36.08 in Table 
8.5 to 42.08 in Table 8.6. In addition, to meet the downside risk constraint, the 
annual normal contribution C increases by 17.8 percent to 3.93 and the proportion 
invested in the low-risk three-month T-bill rises by 54 percent to ω3 = 0.47, com-
pared with the Base case levels of  C = 3.34 and ω3 = 0.30 in Table 8.5.
It is worth noting that if  the adverse longevity and capital market events both 
occur, it will push up the expected total pension cost E(TPC) dramatically by 
24.9 percent, from 36.08 in Table 8.5 to 45.05 in Table 8.6. These changes could 
cause significant financial consequences to the pension sponsor. Both longevity risk 
and capital market risk affect the financial stability of  a pension sponsor.
Next we investigate how pension hedging strategies can mitigate the adverse 
effects arising from these two sources of  risk.
Pension Hedging Strategies
Here we investigate two pension longevity risk-hedging strategies: a ground-up 
hedging strategy, and an excess-risk hedging strategy. The ground-up hedging 
strategy not only reduces longevity risk but also manages capital market risk, as it 
Table 8.5 Optimal normal contribution and asset allocation for the Base 
case given CVaR95%(TUL) = 60 and E(TUL) = 0 and different mortality 
improvement parameters g in the Lee and Carter Model (1992)
g C ω1 ω2 ω3 E(TPC) J
−0.20 3.34 0.27 0.43 0.30 36.08 624.41
−0.30 3.50 0.28 0.39 0.33 37.77 670.84
−0.40 3.62 0.28 0.36 0.36 39.06 709.96
Notes: C stands for the normal contribution. J is the value of  the objective function 
in Model (13), which measures the variance of  total unfunded liability. ( ω1, ω2, ω3) 
represents the investment strategy where ω1, ω2, andω3 are the proportions invested 
in the S&P 500 index, Merrill Lynch corporate bond index, and 3-month T-bill, 
respectively. g is the mortality improvement parameter in the Lee and Carter Model 
(1992). E(TPC) represents the expected total pension cost of  the plan. The Base 
case assumes the financial market maintains the same trend and volatility that it has 
demonstrated throughout the past 20 years.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
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transfers both pension asset and liability risks to pension risk takers. The ground-up 
hedging strategy, given a full hedge, is equivalent to a pension buyout, and the 
excess-risk hedging, also given a full hedge, is equivalent to a mortality option; see 
Cox et al. (2013) for a discussion of  both.
The Ground-up or Buyout Hedging Strategy
Suppose the plan implements a ground-up hedging strategy and transfers a pro-
portion hG of  pension assets and liabilities to a hedge provider by paying a price 
equal to
HP
h Ba x T
G
G G
T=
+( ) ( )
+( )
1
1
δ
ρ
( )
where Ba x T( )( )  is the expected present value of  pension payments at retirement 
T and δG  is the unit hedge cost. Given that the plan pays a hedge price HPG, the 
available fund for pension asset investment at t  =  0 is PA M M HPG G G0 = = − , 
which is lower than that of  the no-hedge case with PA M0 = . In our example, 
M = 5. With the hedge ratio hG, the pension liability retained by the plan becomes
PBO
h Ba x T
t T
h Ba y t T T
t
G
G
T t
G
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Table 8.6 Optimal normal contribution and asset allocation for the BaseX2 
case given CVaR95%(TUL) = 60 and E(TUL) = 0 and different mortality 
improvement parameters g in the Lee–Carter Model (1992)
g C ω1 ω2 ω3 E(TPC) J
−0.20 3.93 0.08 0.45 0.47 42.08 619.92
−0.30 4.12 0.08 0.43 0.48 43.97 660.39
−0.40 4.22 0.08 0.42 0.49 45.05 697.99
Note: C stands for the normal contribution. J is the value of  the objective function in 
Model (5-13), which measures the variance of  total unfunded liability. ( ω1, ω2, ω3) 
represents the investment strategy where ω1, ω2, andω3 are the proportions invested 
in the S&P 500 index, Merrill Lynch corporate bond index, and 3-month T-bill, 
respectively. g is the mortality improvement parameter in the Lee and Carter Model 
(1992). E(TPC) represents the expected total pension cost of  the plan. The Base 
case assumes the financial market maintains the same trend and volatility that it has 
demonstrated throughout the past 20 years.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
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In this expression, a x T( )( )  is the life annuity factor for age x at retirement T and 
a y t( )( )  is the life annuity factor for age y after retirement T with t T T= + +1 2, ,… .
Suppose the plan adopts the optimal asset allocation and normal contribution 
strategies shown in Table 8.5. Table 8.7 shows how the ground-up hedging strategy 
mitigates the funding downside risk caused by the capital market risk and longevity 
risk for the Base case with different hedge ratios.
With the ground-up hedging strategy, when hG > 0, all CVaR TUL95%( ) s in 
Table 8.7 are lower than CVaR TUL95 60%( ) =  without hedging. Table 8.7 also 
shows that as hG  increases, CVaR TUL95%( )  and E(TPC) decrease, indicating a 
lower pension risk to the plan. For example, when δG = 0, as hG increases from 0.1 
to 0.15, CVaR95%(TUL) decreases from 46.91 to 40.38 and E(TPC) decreases from 
34.81 to 34.18. The hedge cost δG, however, reduces the risk reduction effect of  the 
ground-up hedging. For example, when δG = 0 and hG = 0.15, CVaR95%(TUL) is only 
40.38 but it increases to 42.16 when δG = 0.1 and hG = 0.15. As a robustness check, 
we also examine the ground-up hedging strategy with different combinations of  g 
and the pension asset parameters. All of  them echo the pattern we observe in Table 
8.7. We conclude that the ground-up hedging strategy can effectively reduce the 
capital market and longevity risks imbedded in a pension plan.
Table 8.7 Ground-up edging strategy for Base case with g = −0.2
δG = 0 δG = 0.05 δG = 0.1
hG = 0.1 hG = 0.15 hG = 0.1 hG = 0.15 hG = 0.1 hG = 0.15
C 3.34 3.34 3.34 3.34 3.34 3.34
ω1 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
ω2 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43
ω3 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
E(TUL) −7.93 −11.90 −7.31 −10.96 −6.68 −10.02
E(TPC) 34.81 34.18 35.03 34.52 35.26 34.86
CVaR95%(TUL) 46.91 40.38 47.50 41.27 48.09 42.16
J 625.75 628.73 631.62 637.40 637.58 646.26
HPG 2.36 3.54 2.48 3.72 2.60 3.90
Note: C stands for the normal contribution. ( ω1, ω2, ω1) represents the investment strategy 
where ω2, ω2, and ω3 are the proportions invested in the S&P 500 index, Merrill Lynch 
corporate bond index, and 3-month T-bill, respectively. g is the mortality improvement 
parameter in the Lee and Carter Model (1992). TUL and TPC represent the total unfunded 
liability and total pension cost of  the plan. J is the value of  the objective function in Model 
(5-13), which measures the variance of  total unfunded liability. HPG, hG, and δG are the 
hedge price, hedge ratio, and unit hedge cost under the ground-up hedging strategy. The 
Base case assumes the financial market maintains the same trend and volatility that it has 
demonstrated throughout the past 20 years.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.
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The Excess-risk Hedging or Insurance Option 
Strategy
The second pension hedging strategy, the excess-risk hedging strategy, focuses on 
transferring the high-end longevity risk. With the excess-risk hedging strategy, the 
plan needs to determine a strike level on the s-year survival probability s x Tp ,  for age 
x at retirement T in each year t, t T T= + +1 2, ,…  above which to transfer a pro-
portion hE of  the longevity risk. The conditional expected s-year survival rate, ˆ ,s x Tp , 
is defined as s x T s x T x T x T x s T sp E p p p pˆ [ , , , ], , , , ,= + + + − + −   … 1 1 1 1 , where px s T s+ − + −1 1, is the 
one-year survival rate for age x + s − 1 in year T + s − 1.
Suppose at t = 0, the plan purchases a series of  European call options with strike lev-
els set at the expected survival rates, 
s x T s x Tp E p s, ,[ ], , ,= = … 1 2 . The option payoffs 
in years T T+ +1 2, ,…  are determined by max{ , }, , ,, ,0 1 2B p B p ss x T s x T …− =  . 
Accordingly, to hedge a proportion hE , the plan needs to pay a hedge price of
HP
h E v B p B p
E
E E s
s x T s x Ts
T=
+( ) −{ } 
+( )
=
∞∑1 0
1
1
δ
ρ
max ,, ,
where δE  is the hedge cost per unit of  longevity risk ceded. With the hedge ratio hE, 
the plan’s liability becomes
PBO
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With the hedge price HPE, the fund available for investment at time 0 is reduced 
to M M HPE E= − . Again, in our example, we assume M = 5  and the pension 
plan implements the optimal asset allocation and normal contribution strategies 
shown in Table 8.5. With different combinations of  g and the pension asset param-
eters, we find the same pattern as Table 8.7 with the ground-up hedging strategy 
(results available on request from the authors). That is, with a positive hedge ratio 
hE, CVaR TUL95%( )  and E(TPC) are lower than those without hedge. However, the 
magnitude of  risk reduction achieved by the excess-risk hedging strategy is much 
lower than that of  the ground-up hedging strategy. For example, when g = −0.20, 
the pension asset parameters in Table 8.1 and hG = 0.1, CVaR TUL95 46 91%( ) .=  
with the ground-up hedging strategy. However, at the same levels of  g and the 
pension asset parameters, the excess-risk strategy only reduces CVaR TUL95%( ) to 
56.44 even with a full hedge of  longevity risk above the expected survival rates (i.e., 
hE = 1 ). This is explained by the fact that the excess-risk strategy only transfers the 
high-end longevity risk but not the pension asset risk, while the ground-up strategy 
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reduces both pension asset and liability risks. In many cases, the capital market risk 
on pension assets seems to impose a more significant effect on the pension plan 
than the longevity risk.
Conclusion
Concern regarding capital market risk often eclipses that due to longevity risk in 
pension management. When it comes to retirement issues, however, these two risks 
are integrally linked. The number of  sustainable years for a retirement portfolio is 
determined, in part, by market crashes, changes in market volatility, and changes 
in life expectancy. There are instruments to handle capital market volatility, which 
include futures and forward contracts to hedge interest rate, currency, and price 
risks; there are also derivatives to hedge credit risks, weather risks, and more. There 
are insurance instruments to handle the volatility of  life; these instruments include 
life insurance and life annuities. These insurance instruments have not, however, 
been designed to deal with the systematic component of  the life risks. If  life expec-
tancy unexpectedly increases (e.g. a cure for cardiovascular disease or cancer is 
found), then life insurance becomes more profitable for the insurer but life annuities 
become less profitable, or may even threaten insurer solvency and adversely impact 
retirement plans of  individuals and pension funds.
To address these issues, we created scenarios to assess risk for both the individ-
ual and the institution. In the case of  the individual, scenario analysis showed that 
if  the individual invested in a lifecycle fund such as that offered by TIAA-CREF 
and the financial markets were driven by historical parameters, then a $1 million 
investment at retirement combined with a withdrawal rate of  $75,000 per year 
would yield approximately 20 sustainable years. This is one year more than the 
life expectancy of  a 65-year-old male in 2013. Most financial planners would 
consider this as an inadequate retirement horizon, and many would advocate 
planning for a much longer horizon.14 The same analysis shows that one could 
only say that the fund would last for ten years with a 99 percent probability. 
Similarly, if  market parameters were doubled so that crashes occurred more 
often and the market was more volatile (i.e. BaseX2 case), one could expect the 
fund to last less than ten years and the fund would last for four years with 99 per-
cent probability. This leaves the investor with considerable uncertainty. Yet the 
TIAA-CREF-type lifecycle fund held 40 percent in equity, 40 percent in bonds, 
and 20 percent in T-bills. The analysis also showed that the investor could select 
an alternative portfolio to increase the number of  sustainable years. If  the inves-
tor held all in the bond fund, he could expect the portfolio to continue paying the 
same $75,000 per year for almost 35 years. Additionally, if  the investor’s returns 
were in the worst 1 percent of  the portfolio payoffs then he could still expect 
almost 18 sustainable retirement years, but only if  the portfolio was changed to 
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a 30 percent investment in bonds and a 70 percent investment in T-bills. In the 
BaseX2 case (i.e. a more volatile market), the same investor could expect the port-
folio fund to last almost 24 years if  he plunged in the T-bill fund. In this BaseX2 
case, if  the investor’s returns were in the worst 1 percent of  the portfolio payoffs 
then he could expect 11 sustainable retirement years, but only if  the portfolio 
was altered to a 10 percent investment in bonds and a 90 percent investment in 
T-bills. These numbers do not account for the possible changes in life expectancy 
that will doubtless make even the best numbers here seem even less sufficient. 
The DC plans leave the investor with considerable longevity risk, and without the 
foresight of  increasing the size of  the investment fund they can only reduce the 
annual withdrawal or change the portfolio to attempt to keep the retirement fund 
sustainable for more years. These results emphasize the need for financial instru-
ments that provide a more effective means of  transferring some of  the longevity 
risk to those better able to bear it.
Pension providers bear the longevity risk for DB plans. The pension provider 
has a fiduciary responsibility to act in the interest of  the plan members and there-
fore our scenario objective was to minimize pension underfunding subject to con-
straints on the expected underfunding, short selling, and the size of  the tail of  the 
underfunding distribution. When longevity risk was increased, the solution to the 
constrained minimization problem showed an 8.3 percent increase in the expected 
total pension cost. When increased capital market risk was also added to longevity 
risk, the solution to the constrained minimization problem showed a 24.9 percent 
increase in the expected total pension cost.
To mitigate risk, two longevity risk-hedging schemes were considered. The 
first was similar to a partial buyout of  the pension plan and the analysis showed 
that this hedge could lower the pension failure risk. When longevity risk was 
increased, the reduction in pension risk between the hedged and unhedged sce-
narios became more pronounced; when capital market risk was also increased, 
the reduction in pension failure risk between the hedged and unhedged scenar-
ios was even more pronounced. The second hedge was a longevity option. Here 
there was no exchange of  assets; rather, there was only an exchange of  liabilities 
in the tail. As was the case with the partial buyout strategy, the longevity option 
strategy also demonstrated a reduction in pension failure risk that increased with 
the size of  the hedge.
In sum, improvements can result from managing longevity risk in the context of  
both defined contribution and defined benefit schemes. Today’s DC risk manage-
ment schemes are currently far too limited (e.g. life annuities and reverse mort-
gages, among others), and additional financial instruments can help fill the gap. 
The DB risk management possibilities are limited also, but they have received more 
attention in academia and in capital markets. Other hedging schemes must also be 
addressed.
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Notes
 1. See BBC News (2010).
 2. For more discussion of  buyouts and buy-ins, see Blake et al. (2013).
 3. Embedded value is the present value of  future profits plus adjusted net asset value.
 4. For example, Vita II–Swiss Re 2005 ($362 million), Vita III–Swiss Re 2007 ($705 mil-
lion), Vita IV–Swiss Re 2009/10 ($175 million), Vita V–Swiss Re 2012 ($275 million), 
Tartan–Scottish Re 2006 ($155 million), and OSIRIS–AXA 2006 ($442 million).
 5. For more on this, see Feinstein (1993), Blake et al. (2006), Wang et al. (2007), and 
Coughlan (2014).
 6. TIAA-CREF stands for a Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association–College 
Retirement Equities Fund. A lifecycle fund refers to a fund designed to provide long-term 
appreciation and capital preservation based on the age and retirement date of  the inves-
tors in the fund.
 7. Data were retrieved from TIAA-CREF (2013).
 8. In our simulations based on the parameters estimated from 1989–2010 data, the 
expected risk premium of  S&P 500 over three-month T-bill is around −0.03 each year 
in the Base case and −0.20 in the BaseX2 case. The negative risk premium of  S&P 500 
is consistent with the observation that the return on equities has been 7.6 percentage 
points a year lower than that on government bonds in the U.S. since the end of  1999 (The 
Economist 2012).
 9. If  there is a Poisson event or equivalent crash in the equity market then the expected loss 
in the S&P index is approximately 26 percent, while if  there is a crash in the bond mar-
ket then the expected loss in the bond index is approximately 14 percent.
 10. The mortality data for 1901–1999 are taken from the Human Life Table Database 
(MPIDR 2013), and for 2000–2007 from the Human Mortality Database (HMD 2013); 
these were provided by the University of  California at Berkeley and the Max Planck 
Institute for Demographic Research.
 11. The analysis is static and so the portfolio is assumed to remain the same through 
retirement.
 12. The portfolio (0, 0.05, 0.95) also maximizes the sustainable years in the tail of  the portfo-
lio distribution.
 13. The equality constraint is used rather than an inequality constraint so that the variance 
is not pushed to zero using T-bills (that would also inflate the total pension cost). The 
equality constraint is also important because it generates base cases which we later use 
for comparison with two different longevity risk hedges; there we use the same portfolio 
of  assets generated in the Base case and add a hedging instrument. For this comparison 
to work, we use the equality constraint for CVaR and no constraint on the total pension 
cost.
 14. See Krueger (2011). Also, former Society of  Actuaries President Anna Rappaport is 
quoted in Powell (2012) as saying ‘The planning horizon should be long, and if  mortality 
data is used to pick it, it should not be life expectancy, but rather the age that there is a 
90 percent or 95 percent chance of  survival.’
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